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RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 002896

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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF/SE NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG  
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND SHORTLEY  
ADDIS ALSO FOR USAU

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [KPKO](#) [PGOV](#) [PREF](#) [PHUM](#) [AU](#) [UN](#) [SU](#)  
SUBJECT: DARFUR: UNSR OULD ABDULLAH BRIEFS P5 REPS

REF: KHARTOUM 02890

Classified By: P/E Chief E. Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) Summary: During a Dec. 22 briefing of P5 ambassadors, UN Special Envoy Ould Abdallah said he delivered UNSYG Annan's letter to President Bashir on Sudan's commitment to phased peacekeeping in Darfur. Ould Abdallah noted Bashir was skeptical, feeling the Darfur situation had been exaggerated and that many sanctions remained in place against Sudan. He requested a written response before returning to New York Dec. 23. Charge Hume noted that performance mattered more than promises; Washington is looking for results. Discussion also dealt with UN and AU appointments; participants stressed they be timely and coordinated. End summary.

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Ould Abdallah: Bashir Friendly, but Skeptical  
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12. (C) During a December 22 briefing of P5 Ambassadors, UN Special Envoy Ahmadou Ould Abdallah said that he had met with President Bashir on December 21 to deliver a letter from UNSYG Annan requesting confirmation of Sudan's commitment to the Addis Ababa and Abuba framework agreements on peacekeeping operations in Darfur. Ould Abdallah surmised that this should be easy, given that the Council of Ministers had endorsed the matter earlier; however, he acknowledged that the timing of the issue, with several visitors to Khartoum and the holiday, that timing might present a challenge. Bashir was friendly, but skeptical; he accepted the need to address the Darfur conflict, but felt it had been exaggerated. He complained that rebels were traveling in Europe and North America, and that they had resources and outside support. It was difficult to take rebels seriously; also, the frequent creation of new groups made discussion difficult.

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Ould Abdallah Seeks Response; Bashir Lists Complaints  
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13. (C) Bashir felt that if Sudan agreed to follow through with its commitments, others would not work to implement them. He listed lack of support for previous assistance pledges, economic sanctions, failure of the IMF and World Bank to address outstanding Sudanese debt, and retention on the list of State Sponsors of terrorism (Note: All are primarily U.S. bilateral issues. End note.) Bashir asked that if Sudan were to act, would the UN fast track its own efforts? Ould Abdallah said he believed Bashir would accept the phased peacekeeping approach, although it would be a lengthy process. He asked Bashir to respond to Annan's letter before he departed on December 23; Ould Abdallah hoped

to see the letter early in the day, and not receive merely "Christmas wishes."

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CDA Hume: Sudan has Agreed; Proof Lies in Performance  
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¶4. (C) Charge Hume pointed out that Sudan had already agreed to the phased peacekeeping approach in both Addis Ababa and Abuja, and that capitals needed to see people on the ground as evidence of acceptance. He also noted that the EU-U.S. meeting in Washington in early January would address unmet funding issues for the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). Darfur partners should not assume there is money on the table; he recalled that the League of Arab States had not met its USD 150 million pledge. Ould Abdallah replied that he sought written commitment to Phase I and II, and agreement to accept or at least not oppose Phase III. Hume reiterated the importance of performance over promises.

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UN Team to Meet on Implementation Details  
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¶5. (C) UNMIS Office in Charge Taye-Brook Zerihoun noted a meeting would be held on December 24 to discuss implementation details for the light package; if Sudan has not cooperated, it would be reported. He added that President Bashir needed to address the "what and how" of a hybrid force. The June 2006 assessment indicated roughly 17,000 troops were needed for Darfur. Taye-Brook also addressed the issue of the proliferating initiatives on Darfur, adding that an AU/UN joint team would review them to determine if any could be useful. The team would also review

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the status of the DPA non-signatories with respect to the initiatives.

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Timing, Coordination of UN and AU Appointments Key  
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¶6. (C) The French ambassador urged that preparations be undertaken now to avoid delays later in appointing an UN Special Representative. Considerable discussion ensued regarding consultations required to appoint AU and UN representatives. Regarding the AMIS Force Commander, Taye-Brook affirmed that the status quo would remain until July 1, 2007, when Phase III is slated to commence. Three key appointments would be made in the phased approach: a UN Special Representative on Darfur decided jointly by the AU and the UN; an AMIS Force Commander selected by the AU in consultation with the UN, and the new Special Representative for UNMIS, concerned with North-South matters.

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CDA Hume: Need to Fill AU Leadership Vacuum  
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¶7. (C) In discussion regarding the lack of AU leadership on the ground, Charge Hume noted that the USG shared the sense of urgency in making timely selections of AU and UN officials. The AU is decapitated, and needs to fill its leadership vacuum. Taye-Brook concurred, and noted that strengthening AU leadership was essential for the phased peacekeeping approach. Balance between UN and AU capacities is also important, he added, as is avoiding different understandings of the situation in Darfur.  
HUME